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WAR OF THE WORDS: HOW COURTS
CAN USE DICTIONARIES IN ACCORDANCE
WITH TEXTUALIST PRINCIPLES
PHILLIP A. RUBIN†
Few people ask by what authority the writers of dictionaries and
grammars say what they say.
1
– S.I. Hayakawa

ABSTRACT
Dictionaries have an aura of authority about them—words mean
what the dictionary says they mean. It therefore seems only sensible
that courts seeking the plain meaning of language would look to
dictionaries to find it. Yet to employ dictionaries as objective sources
of meaning is to use them in a manner inconsistent with their creation
and purpose. Previous scholarship has identified the Supreme Court’s
increasing reliance on dictionaries in construing statutes and
constitutional provisions, and several articles have discussed different
inherent problems with this practice. This Note builds upon that
scholarship by bringing together the problems identified in prior
articles, by identifying additional problems, and by proposing a set of
best practices for courts seeking to use dictionaries in a manner
consistent with textualist principles. Unless a principled approach is
adopted, judges invoking dictionaries in textualist analysis are open to
criticism for, at best, using dictionaries incorrectly—and, at worst,
using them to reach their preferred outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
Judge Harold Leventhal once said, and Justice Scalia has
repeated, that the use of legislative history is “the equivalent of
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the
guests for one’s friends,” allowing judges to pick the evidence that
2
best supports their own policy preferences. Legislative history,
however, is not the only external source of interpretation which can
be used in this way. Dictionaries, too, lend themselves to this sort of
manipulation, and in recent years, the Court has referred increasingly
3
to dictionaries to determine the ordinary meanings of words.
4
Dictionary usage is particularly important in textualist analysis,
which seeks to find “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a
5
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law” and places
foremost priority on the text itself, as opposed to utilizing external
6
sources of understanding. This method has its proclaimed roots in
democratic principles: if the nebulous intent of the legislature controls
over the plain meaning of its published text, how could citizens be on
7
notice about the law which they are to follow?
Textualism has seen increased purchase on the Supreme Court in
8
recent years, and with it, the Court has relied increasingly on
9
dictionaries in its opinions. Prior to 1864, the Court used dictionaries
10
as authority only three times. Yet during the 1990 through 1998

2. E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (crediting
Judge Leventhal for the metaphor).
3. See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1437, 1438–42 (1994) (detailing the increased reliance by the Supreme Court on dictionaries,
focusing in particular on the 1988–1992 Terms); see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:
Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 app. (1998) (detailing
dictionary usage from the 1988 Term through the 1995 Term).
4. Aprill, supra note 3, at 280 (“Dictionary definition plays a key role for textualism.”).
5. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 17 (1997).
6. See id. (discussing the purposes of and principles behind statutory interpretation).
7. See id. (stating that interpreting statutes based on legislative intent is “simply
incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government”).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the Court’s
increased tendency to cite to dictionaries, see Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The
Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 227, 244–62 (1999). It is covered here briefly only to frame the problem at hand
and to update the data.
10. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 244–62.
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Terms, the Court used dictionaries to define more than 220 terms.
This trend has continued into the 2000s, with the Court citing
dictionaries (legal, specialty, or general purpose) in twenty-three
12
cases during the 2008–2009 Term alone. This is consistent with
earlier findings, for example, that the Court utilized dictionary
definitions in 28 percent of the 107 cases for which opinions were
13
published in the 1991 Term.
The manner in which the Court uses dictionaries has changed
over time as well. Although in the past the Court would “employ[]
dictionaries to refresh the Justices’ memory about the meaning of
words, or to provide potential meanings from which the Court would
select based on statutory purpose, legislative intent, common sense,
or some other contextual argument,” more recent cases have placed
dictionaries—rather than policy, context, or structure—at the center
14
of the case. Though previous scholars have suggested that
dictionaries are less accepted in questions of constitutional
15
interpretation, several significant new cases suggest that dictionaries
now play a crucial role in the interpretation of the Constitution as
16
well. With core constitutional questions, such as the meaning of the
17
Second Amendment, being decided on the basis of dictionary
definitions, it can no longer be said that the “use of the dictionary to
18
define constitutional terms . . . is an exception to the rule.”
Despite the Court’s increasing focus on dictionaries, scholars
have identified several distinct and important problems regarding the
use of these tools in legal reasoning. These problems include arbitrary
11. Id. at 256.
12. A Westlaw search in the SCT database for “dictionary & da(aft 8/2008 & bef 7/2009)”
yielded twenty-three results.
13. Note, supra note 3, at 1438.
14. Id. at 1439–40 (footnote omitted). For an example of a recent case in which the Court
placed dictionary definition at the heart of the analysis, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128
S. Ct. 2783 (2008). This case is discussed in Part IV.B, infra.
15. See, e.g., Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 277 (noting that “the Court has relied
on dictionaries in comparatively few cases interpreting the Constitution” and attributing that
trend to an opinion by Justice Holmes describing the flexible nature of the Constitution).
16. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (using legal and
general dictionaries to define “affidavit” as it has been applied to the Confrontation Clause);
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791–92 (relying extensively on dictionaries to define the individual terms of
the Second Amendment); Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2683 (2008) (using a dictionary to
define “procure” and “procurement” as “to contrive and effect” in the context of making a
witness unavailable).
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 278.
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and arguably even biased selection of dictionaries by judges, lack of
20
determination as to the qualifications of a particular dictionary, and
failure to account for context when using a dictionary to define a
21
single term. Dictionaries, despite their allure as seemingly perfect
arbiters of word meaning, do not reach the end goal of word
definition. Ultimately, a court citing a dictionary is not seeking to find
out what the dictionary says but rather what the word itself means—
with the dictionary merely serving as a window into the lexicon. This
means that any legal analysis must account for the inherent
22
limitations of dictionaries as proxies for the lexicon. This Note seeks
to bring together the varying analyses, cautions, and criticisms in the
literature and then proposes guidelines for the citation of dictionaries
in briefs, arguments, and judicial opinions—with the ultimate goal of
promoting consistency between the use of dictionaries and textualist
principles.
Part I reviews the principles of textualism and how the use of
dictionaries conflicts with these principles for many of the same
reasons that some textualist critics fault the use of legislative history.
Part II then turns to the science of dictionaries and the processes used
in creating them, identifying additional pitfalls. Part III brings
together these criticisms and warnings to construct a model of proper
dictionary usage in textualist argument. Finally, Part IV analyzes that
model in the context of two cases that involved controversial uses of
23
dictionaries.
I. TEXTUALISM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND LEXICOGRAPHY
The Court’s increased use of dictionaries relates to a broader
trend within the Court toward the use of textualist methodology in
24
statutory and constitutional interpretation. For Justices who place
great emphasis on the objective meaning of words, dictionaries are
appealing as easy and clear sources of that meaning.

19. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part III.D.
21. See, e.g., Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the
Dictionary when Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 406 (2003)
(“Dictionaries are less helpful when the inquiry properly extends beyond the word level.”).
22. See infra Part III.
23. For a discussion of the lack of judicial guidelines for using dictionaries, see Thumma &
Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 290.
24. Note, supra note 3, at 1440.
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A. Textualism and Original Plain Meaning
Justice Scalia describes the core principle of textualism as the
belief that “[a] text should not be construed strictly, and it should not
be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain
25
all that it fairly means.” Driving this method of interpretation is a
strong belief that judges are not given providence to create law—a
statute or constitutional provision means whatever the language in it
means, nothing more and nothing less. To be a “textualist in good
standing,” Justice Scalia says, “[o]ne need only hold the belief that
judges have no authority to pursue [social or policy objectives] or
26
write . . . new laws.” Justice Scalia is particularly associated with
originalism, a corollary of textualism focusing on the original intent or
27
meaning of the words in question. And originalism, particularly
Justice Scalia’s form of originalism, has seen increased acceptance by
28
the Supreme Court during Scalia’s tenure.
Like textualism, originalism can take several forms. Some
originalists focus on the “original intent” of the provision, acquired by
29
looking to the recorded intent of the drafters. Others, including
Justice Scalia, focus instead on the “original plain meaning” of the
provision—the meaning ordinary people would have understood at
the time of the statute’s adoption, regardless of any secret or
unknown intent that may have existed in the minds of the provision’s
30
31
framers. Justice Scalia describes this method as “new textualism”

25. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 23 (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989) (discussing originalism and comparing it to other philosophies).
28. See George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 323 (1995)
(“Textualist interpretation seems to have gained increased attention, including on the Supreme
Court, particularly since the arrival of Justice Scalia.” (footnotes omitted)).
29. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239,
247–55 (2009) (discussing “original intent” originalism and its eventual evolution into “original
plain meaning” originalism).
30. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38 (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I
look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen
intended.”); Taylor, supra note 28, at 331 (noting that such conservative thinkers as Justice
Scalia, Judge Frank Easterbrook, and Professor Richard Epstein subscribe to original meaning
originalism). Some scholars have pointed to the tension between “plain” and “ordinary”
meaning, referring to dictionaries as an example of plain meaning that might not be ordinary.
See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2036–
38 (2005) (arguing that the distinction between these two terms—not generally made by the
Court—would affect which evidence a court would consider in its analyses).
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and, in the words of Professor William Eskridge, as the “best, and
32
perhaps only legitimate, approach to statutory interpretation.”
As the name suggests, all forms of textualism focus on the text
itself, claiming legitimacy in the idea that judges, when limited to the
words within the provision to be interpreted, cannot as easily inject
33
their own preferences into their interpretations. By doing so,
textualism invokes the democratic value that the people’s legislature,
not unelected judges, should create the law, and judges should be
34
limited to objective interpretational sources of the law’s meaning.
Although most textualists, particularly new textualists, reject external
sources of interpretation such as legislative history, they still accept
that “the terms, usage, or context of the larger statutory framework
35
may help resolve apparent ambiguity.”
B. New Textualists and the Perils of Legislative History
Textualists—especially new textualists like Justice Scalia—
generally reject legislative history as a source of interpretative

31. Describing Justice Scalia as the “most notable” of the new textualists, Jason Weinstein
defines “new textualism” as “a method of statutory interpretation whereby a judge reads a
statute and asks how the ordinary reader would interpret the text.” Jason Weinstein, Note,
Against Dictionaries: Using Analogical Reasoning to Achieve a More Restrained Textualism, 38
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 649, 650 (2005). Calling the use of a dictionary a “failed mechanism to
pinpoint exact parameters of words when it is written to do exactly the opposite,” Weinstein
argues that new textualists should avoid dictionaries entirely, substituting analogical reasoning
in their place. Id. at 673. This Note disagrees with a wholesale prohibition on the use of
dictionaries, instead creating a framework under which dictionaries can be used in a manner
consistent with textualist principles. See infra Part III.
32. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 235 (2d ed. 2006) (describing Justice Scalia’s
position on new textualism). Although Justice Scalia’s new textualism in particular has seen
increased acceptance on the Court, this Note addresses textualism generally, given that
whichever denomination of textualism one might ascribe to, the basic rule of determining the
objective meaning of statutory language from the text of the statute itself easily suggests the use
of dictionaries as an objective interpretative tool. This observation is true whether one applies
“soft plain meaning” textualism, in which the text controls absent “compelling evidence of a
contrary legislative intent,” id. at 232, or something more akin to Justice Scalia’s new textualism.
33. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38–39 (criticizing the concept of a “Living Constitution” as
an improper method of constitutional interpretation).
34. See id. (explaining that nontextualist modes of constitutional interpretation allow
judges to “trump[] even the statutes of democratic legislatures”). Despite its claims to
objectivity, textualism has likewise been criticized for selectively using certain interpretive tools
to reach desired outcomes. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
35. Taylor, supra note 28, at 342–43.
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meaning. Justice Scalia cites four types of issues that make the use of
legislative history problematic—issues, it turns out, that are similar to
the problems that arise when dictionaries are relied upon for
statutory interpretation.
First, Justice Scalia points to historical practice: focusing on
legislative history, he claims, was not “the traditional English, and the
37
traditional American, practice.” Quoting Chief Justice Taney,
Justice Scalia argues that:
[T]he only mode in which [the will of Congress] is spoken is in the
act itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there
used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon
the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of
38
the times in which it was passed.

Justice Scalia asserts that “[e]xtensive use of legislative history in this
country dates only from about the 1940s,” arguing that such use is a
39
new creation inconsistent with traditional American jurisprudence.
Second, Justice Scalia argues that legislative history is improper
because it is external to the statute. This argument relates to elements
of both Congressional power—Congress only says that which it has
40
passed in accordance with Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution —
and of fair notice. According to Justice Scalia, using legislative intent
rather than the specific text approved is “one step worse than the
trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up

36. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 236 (“Justice Scalia is insistent that judges
should almost never consult, and never rely on, the legislative history of a statute.”).
37. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 30.
38. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id.
40. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 236; see also SCALIA, supra note 5, at 35 (“A
statute, however, has a claim to our attention simply because Article I, section 7 of the
Constitution provides that since it has been passed by the prescribed majority (with or without
adequate understanding), it is a law.”). Justice Scalia points out the perils of relying on legislative
history by quoting a debate on the Senate floor during which the committee chair admitted that
he had neither helped to write nor read in full the committee report of the bill under
consideration. The Senate, the transcript points out, neither formally considered nor adopted
the committee report when adopting the bill itself, yet such a report was likely to be cited were
the Court to later evaluate the final statute. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 32–34. Justice Scalia
also points out that this concern would not be remedied even if legislators knew the content of
the committee reports, because a legislator’s knowledge of what the bill means is “not a
precondition for the authoritativeness of a statute,” id. at 34, because Article I, Section 7 places
no such condition on Congress, id. at 35.
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on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read.” To look beyond
the statute to an external source of meaning is to interpret the text
according to an understanding not approved by Congress and not
42
easily accessible to the governed.
Third, Scalia asserts that even if these concerns could be
addressed, legislative history is an impractical and perhaps impossible
indicator of congressional intent. Congress is made up of hundreds of
representatives, all voting for their own reasons, which may or may
43
not be expressed in or consistent with the legislative history. How is
a judge to determine what Congress intended? Does Congress ever
44
intend only one, unanimous thing?
Finally, by means of combining these other arguments, Justice
Scalia argues that the use of legislative history stands opposed to the
ideal of judges as simple interpreters of law. On this note, Justice
Scalia invokes Judge Leventhal’s concern about “looking over the
45
heads [of the cocktail party guests] for one’s friends.” Because of the
wide variety of opinions and statements found in most legislative
history, a judge can cite support for the chosen outcome and
simultaneously ignore contradictory evidence also found within the
legislative history. And because legislative history is external to the
statutory text, a judge can interpret a statute to mean something
arguably contrary to the text itself, leaving those reading the statute
46
without notice of the ultimate meaning. Such a practice gives a judge
an improper opportunity to shape the outcome of a case according to
his or her own policy preferences.
C. How Dictionary Use Is Like Legislative History
Despite involving a nearly identical set of difficulties and
objections as legislative history, dictionaries have not received the

41. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17.
42. See id. at 31 (“My Court is frequently told, in briefs and in oral argument, that
‘Congress said thus-and-so’—when in fact what is being quoted is not the law promulgated by
Congress, nor even any text endorsed by a single house of Congress, but rather the statement of
a single committee of a single house, set forth in a committee report.”).
43. See Taylor, supra note 28, at 339 (“The argument raised is that it is impossible to speak
of ‘an’ intent of a multi-member legislature.”).
44. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 219 (discussing critiques of legislative
history which call it “multifaceted, potentially manipulable, and often unfocused and even
contradictory”).
45. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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same scrutiny from Justice Scalia and other textualists. Although
Part II delves more deeply into the science of dictionaries and the
jurisprudential problems they raise, this Section first reviews the
similar problems raised by dictionaries and legislative history.
First, like legislative history, dictionaries are external sources of
48
interpretation. It would be useful for interpretative purposes if
Congress adopted an official dictionary or deputized particular
dictionaries within the definitions sections of various statutes, but
“[l]egislators do not consult dictionaries or incorporate by reference
49
dictionary definitions in drafting statutes.” Without ratification of a
particular dictionary, the use of such a resource in interpretation is
necessarily external, given that dictionaries were not created by or
necessarily consulted by the Congress that adopted the statute.
Therefore, “[w]hen Congress uses a word, the word means what
Congress says it means, all the dictionary definitions to the contrary
50
notwithstanding.” Without knowing which dictionary (or which
definition within a dictionary) the Court might one day use to
construe the statute, a citizen cannot be on guard as to what the
51
statute means—it may as well be hung up on one of Nero’s poles.
Second, dictionaries have not historically been used as
extensively as the Court (and Justice Scalia in particular) uses them

47. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 441, 445 (1990) (noting that, unlike legislative history, the text of a statute has passed “a
difficult set of procedural hurdles and either passed by a two-thirds vote or obtained the
President’s signature,” but failing to address that dictionaries have not passed such hurdles
either); see also Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872 (1930) (“A
legislative intent, undiscoverable in fact, irrelevant if it were discovered, is the last residuum of
our ‘golden rule.’ It is a queerly amorphous piece of slag. Are we really reduced to such shifts
that we must fashion monsters and endow them with imaginations in order to understand
statutes?”).
48. For the argument that textualists treat dictionaries as an “inherent part of determining
the meaning of the text,” making them essentially internal, see Aprill, supra note 3, at 280.
49. Id. at 299; see also Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 247
(1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Congress that passed McCarran-Ferguson was composed
of neither insurance experts nor dictionary editors.”). Congress has imposed some general rules
of construction. For example, a statute’s use of a masculine form applies to the feminine as well;
the use of a singular noun also refers to the plural. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). That statute, originally
referred to as the “Dictionary Act,” Aprill, supra note 3, at 299 n.134, does not prescribe a
particular dictionary or the use of any dictionary at all, 1 U.S.C. § 1.
50. Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 386.
Following this logic, Congress could actually create a new meaning for a word through statute, if
it chose to do so.
51. See text accompanying supra note 41.
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today. This, in and of itself, is not necessarily problematic, but
53
Justice Scalia criticizes legislative history for this same weakness. If
Justice Scalia can invoke Chief Justice Taney to argue that the use of
legislative history lacks a traditional basis in the law, why can others
not invoke, for example, Justice Holmes’s statement that “the
provisions
of
the
Constitution
are
not
mathematical
formulas . . . . [and] their significance is vital not formal; it is to be
54
gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary”?
Finally, dictionaries, like legislative history, can be difficult to use
effectively, which can give rise to judicial manipulation. Despite their
aura of authority, dictionaries do not define the one, true meaning of
a word—they generally provide multiple meanings intended to
55
capture the wide breadth of possible usage. Similar to legislative
history, a judge can use a dictionary to pick out from the “cocktail
party crowd” the meaning that supports the interpretation the judge
is seeking. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that Justice Scalia in
particular does exactly this, declaring the dictionary to provide
objective, clear meaning only when it supports the ideologically
56
conservative outcome. Professor Ellen Aprill goes so far as to assert
that “Justice Scalia’s use of dictionaries as a tool of textualism
appears instrumental indeed, invoked only when it produces the
57
desired result.”
All in all, the use of dictionaries is very similar to the use of
legislative history. Reliance on dictionaries pulls in an external source

52. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 30 (discussing the tendency of courts not to use
legislative history before the 1940s); see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
54. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
55. See B.T. SUE ATKINS & MICHAEL RUNDELL, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL
LEXICOGRAPHY 2 (2008) (“Dictionaries are often perceived as authoritative records of how
people ‘ought to’ use language, and they are regularly invoked for guidance on ‘correct’ usage.
They are seen, in other words, as prescriptive texts. Lexicographers have long been
uncomfortable with this idea . . . .”); HOWARD JACKSON, LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
21 (2002) (“[W]e all take what the dictionary says as authoritative . . . .”); see also infra Part
III.B.
56. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 3, at 321 (“To Justice Scalia, dictionary definitions are
objective and dispositive only when they narrow the power of the federal government.”
(footnote omitted)); see also David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration
of Scalia’s Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1389–90 (1999)
(noting that “Scalia’s opinions generally reflect his theoretical bias toward defining words
narrowly” and discussing Scalia’s use of dictionaries to construe constitutional language
narrowly).
57. Aprill, supra note 3, at 321.
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not ratified (or even, in many cases, read or understood) by
58
Congress and provides judges with the opportunity to selectively
accept whichever of many conflicting statements conforms to a
particular policy outcome. Without a principled method of using
dictionaries in an objective, scientific fashion, it seems difficult to
accept any usage of dictionaries by textualists.
II. THE SCIENCE OF DICTIONARIES
Having broadly likened the use of dictionaries to reliance on
legislative history, this Note now examines the many differences
between them. Far from legitimizing the use of dictionaries as
compared to the use of legislative history, however, these differences
actually uncover additional pitfalls concerning dictionary use in
judicial opinions. This Part discusses how dictionaries are created and
then addresses the dangers created by the inherent qualities of
59
dictionaries.
A. What Is a Dictionary?
Everyone knows what a dictionary is in the everyday sense;
60
dictionaries are “part of the cultural fabric of our society.” At its
most basic, a dictionary is a reference book pertaining to the
61
definitions of words. But even the notion of “the dictionary” as one
monolithic concept is troublesome: there are many dictionaries with
62
different purposes, focuses, budgets, constraints, and methodologies.
Dictionaries can be monolingual or bilingual, and they can focus on
general knowledge or on a specific trade or cultural area. They can be

58. Indeed, legislative history might be more legitimate in this regard, given that legislative
history can at least claim a connection to the legislative process and Congress’s acquiescence to
its publication. Dictionaries are wholly external. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 310
(“Even a textualist might find something of value in legislative history, which might be a more
democratically legitimate guide to meaning than the commonly deployed dictionaries that so
fascinate the current Supreme Court.”).
59. Though the full history of dictionaries is fascinating, this Note does not discuss it,
instead touching on historical concepts only insomuch as they affect the use of dictionaries in
legal interpretation today. For an excellent and detailed discussion of the history of the
dictionary, see generally Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9.
60. JACKSON, supra note 55, at 21.
61. Id.
62. See id. (“Compare some of the entries [of different dictionaries], and you soon realise
that the notion of ‘the dictionary’ as a single text is wide of the mark. What distinguishes them is
more notable than what they have in common.”).
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unabridged or concise—and everything in between. Dictionaries can
focus on different kinds of readers as well: some dictionaries are
intended for native speakers, some seek to translate, and some are
64
designed to help new speakers learn the language. These differences
require decisions early in the planning stages of dictionary creation
that affect the sources chosen for the dictionary, the methodology
used in constructing definitions, and the words and definitions
65
included.
B. How Dictionaries Are Created
Understanding the unique pitfalls presented by dictionaries
requires an understanding of the creation of dictionaries and of
66
lexicography—the science of determining the meaning of words.
Though technology has changed the process considerably, the
creation of a dictionary has always involved amassing examples of
67
usage, which requires a tremendous amount of historical research.
Prior to the 1980s, the primary method of assembling these examples
68
was a hands-on process of creating a catalog of “citation evidence.”
A “citation” is a “short extract from a text which provides evidence
69
for a word, phrase, usage, or meaning in authentic use.” Such
extracts were collected by hand, sometimes using volunteers, and
until the late twentieth century, were recorded on index cards and
70
kept in a file. Here, one of the first editorial judgments of dictionary

63. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 24–25 (detailing the properties of different
types of dictionaries).
64. See id. (listing specific considerations for, among other dictionary properties, a
dictionary’s language, coverage, size, and purpose).
65. See id. at 27–28 (discussing the various decisions made during the creation of a
dictionary).
66. This Note discusses only briefly the deep underpinnings of lexicography here, as a
broader overview of the process is sufficient to display potential problems dictionaries pose for
legal scholars. For a good discussion of the lexicographical processes utilized by modern
dictionary editors, see, for example, Aprill, supra note 3, at 283–300.
67. See SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 44
(2d ed. 2001) (discussing the massive volume of information that lexicographers must sort
through and the degree of scholarship required to complete the process).
68. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 48, 50.
69. Id. at 48.
70. Id. at 50. Some of the vast citation files are still found only in paper form because the
cards cannot be scanned into a computer due to faint type or handwriting. See LANDAU, supra
note 67, at 190 (describing the formation of citation files).
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71

creation is evident: which citations are included? Selecting both the
sources for citations and the individual citations themselves involves a
“big subjective element,” and “human readers tend to notice what is
remarkable and ignore what is typical, [creating] a bias towards the
novel or idiosyncratic usages which inevitably catch the reader’s
72
eye.”
The arrival of computers and databases dramatically changed the
methodology used to create dictionaries, but it left the fundamental
question of source selection similarly subjective. Nowadays, most
dictionary authors create a “corpus,” which is a collection of whole or
partial texts or recorded speech stored and indexed electronically so
73
that individual words can be found quickly. Some corpora contain
millions of words, and “may include all or parts of the running text of
newspapers, books of fiction and nonfiction, magazines, scholarly and
literary works, transcripts of television or radio programs, and
74
unscripted speech.” Citation files, however, are still utilized to some
75
extent in modern dictionaries.
Even with corpora, some choices remain. A corpus is intended to
be a sample of the language, representing the whole language in much
the same way as a statistical sample is meant to represent the
76
population. Like any scientific research involving samples, the
representativeness of the sample affects the viability of the results

71. See Hayakawa, supra note 1, at 71 (“The writing of a dictionary, therefore, is not a task
of setting up authoritative statements about the ‘true meanings’ of words, but a task of
recording, to the best of one’s ability, what various words have meant to authors in the distant or
immediate past.”).
72. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 52.
73. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 190.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 193 (“However important corpora are, they cannot be as up-to-the-minute as
citation files, because it takes time to convert and process text and to incorporate it into the rest
of the corpus. So citation collection is still important for finding new words and senses and for
spotting trends in usage . . . .”); see also id. at 182 (“The native-speaker dictionaries have been
slower to make use of corpora than [English-as-a-second-language] dictionaries . . . .”). But see
ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 53 (“Citation reading continues to have value, especially
as a form of lexicographic training. But now that most written texts . . . are available in digital
form, it has become a more marginal way of collecting linguistic data.”).
76. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 54 (discussing the impossibility of collecting
every instance of the use of a modern language, thus making the corpus a sample).
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drawn from it. Dictionary makers must determine which sources to
77
include in the corpus and how large it will be.
Ensuring that the corpus is truly representative of the language
can be difficult for a number of reasons. First, skewing can occur with
the inclusion of technical sources, which may use some words at a
frequency vastly greater than in the language as a whole. For
example, the British National Corpus shows the same number of hits
for “unfortunate” as it does for “mucosa,” due to the inclusion of a
large amount of data from Gut: The Journal of Gastroenterology and
78
Hepatology. As with most statistical data, a larger number of sources
79
helps a corpus to avoid skewing based on outliers.
Second, a majority of meaningful communication is spoken—
particularly that which is unscripted and conversational—yet the
majority of the sample for a corpus necessarily comes from published
80
writing, meaning that a corpus will overrepresent written language.
81
Third, the corpus “does not favour ‘high quality’ language” in the
way that citation files did in the past, because a corpus does not rely
on selections of specific passages and sentences which represent the
82
best usage of the language. Yet, paradoxically, corpora may in some
ways be underrepresentative of “lower quality” language as well. If
there is “no real distinction between formal and informal usage
83
except among the privileged and highly educated,” then any corpus
focusing more on formal usages (which are more likely to be seen in
print) would necessarily underrepresent the speech patterns of those
84
with less education. This issue is relevant to the use of dictionaries in
77. See id. at 57 (noting the decisions that corpus designers must make). But see id. (“For
major languages like English, data sparseness is a thing of the past and corpus size has almost
ceased to be an issue.”).
78. Id. at 69. Although this problem can largely be avoided with due care, seemingly
representative sources can be skewed simply by, for example, including a work of fiction in
which the main character is a neurosurgeon whose work is described in technical detail. See id.
(giving as an example the novel Saturday by Ian McEwan).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 77–78 (discussing the difficulties of recording “spontaneous, unscripted
speech”). In the past, volunteers were recruited to create tape-recorded conversations to
generate such samples for the corpus—but such information is costly. Id. at 77.
81. Id. at 55.
82. See id. (“The whole point of using corpora is to avoid pre-judging the data and
choosing texts because you approve of them in some way.”).
83. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 257.
84. It is for this reason, Landau surmises, that WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1961) dropped the “informal” label, causing a huge controversy in the process.
See id. at 258 (“The editors may have felt that they could not define or know the attitudes of the
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analysis because anyone looking for the ordinary meaning of words
wants to know how the average user would understand them—and
such skewing affects the dictionary’s ability to represent the average
user. At the same time, the corpus method avoids some bias by not
depending as much on the “collective judgments of a large number of
people over an extended period of time” in the same way as a citation
file, which requires that the creators select each individual quote to be
85
included, as opposed to whole sources.
Creating the database (whether of citation cards or a corpus),
however, only begins the process of authoring a dictionary. The
lexicographer must then divide up the various meanings of a word
86
into manageable units. The process involves research, but also
decisionmaking: the primary job of the lexicographer in creating a
dictionary is to determine meanings of words, and to determine what
different meanings a word might have. The line between one meaning
and another is seldom clear, which leaves much of the final
87
determination to the experienced judgment of the editorial staff. As
Sidney Landau, editor of the Cambridge Dictionary of American
English and one of the foremost scholars on lexicography, puts it,
“[a]ll definitions of things are compromises between specific accuracy
and breadth of inclusiveness. . . . [N]o definition can take in all of the
88
particular things referred to by the word defined.” Ultimately, it
“comes down to the lexicographer[s] exercising their informed
89
judgment in the face of the evidence they have to work with.”
Sometimes that judgment even involves the inclusion of eccentric
90
uses made by “established writers of the literary canon.”
class of people to whom some usages would be informal. . . . In deciding not to use the informal
label, [Webster’s Third] simply declined to represent a particular social class.”). See generally
HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD: PHILIP GOVE’S CONTROVERSIAL
DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS (1994) (discussing the controversy surrounding the changes in
presentation and research made in creating Webster’s Third); infra note 104 and accompanying
text.
85. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 192.
86. Id. at 200.
87. See JACKSON, supra note 55, at 91 (explaining that lexicographers must make final
judgments based on their experience and the available evidence); LANDAU, supra note 67, at 62
(“All dictionary makers are sometimes faced with the necessity of making decisions without full
information, which is sometimes impossible to obtain.”).
88. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 182.
89. JACKSON, supra note 55, at 91.
90. See LANDAU, supra note 67, at 203 (discussing the Oxford English Dictionary’s
deliberate focus on inclusion of the works of authors such as T.S. Eliot, James Joyce, and
Virginia Woolf, even including unique uses of words by prolific authors).
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Even after lines are drawn between meanings, several factors can
influence the dictionary’s final form. Space in a dictionary is a zerosum game—including one word or usage necessarily reduces the
91
space available for others. Dictionary editors cannot include
everything in the language, and they are forced to make choices
concerning how detailed to make an entry and which entries to omit
92
entirely. The creation of a dictionary is a “pragmatic enterprise”
93
limited at every stage by constraints of space, budget, and time.
C. Distinctive Traits of Dictionaries
Sidney Landau categorizes dictionaries according to a number of
criteria: the number of languages contained; the variety of English
addressed; the age, purpose, and primary language of the users; the
manner of funding; the period of time meant to be covered; and the
94
size and scope of the work. In addition, dictionaries differ in how
descriptive or prescriptive they intend to be. Each of these elements
can affect the resulting dictionary and its usefulness in legal analysis.

91. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 20–21 (“Space is finite . . . . Even the 20-volume
[Oxford English Dictionary] makes no claim to include all the vocabulary of English. Inevitably,
then, the average one-volume dictionary can cover only a small proportion of the vocabulary of
a language.” (citation omitted)). Online dictionaries could potentially reduce some of the size
limitations present in printed dictionaries. See Erin McKean Redefines the Dictionary, TED
(Mar. 2007), http://www.ted.com/talks/erin_mckean_redefines_the_dictionary.html (discussing
the future of dictionaries).
92. Clarke D. Cunningham and his colleagues describe this well, noting that:
Even when a dictionary does record a usage that corresponds to what appears to be a
legally relevant meaning, it is dangerous to rely on the way that usage is
characterized, categorized, and ordered. Dictionary entries are severely limited by
time and space constraints; lexicographers must prepare thousands of dictionary
entries, each one of which must fit into a very small space and predetermined format.
Whether a particular usage is listed first or last in an entry has no bearing on whether
it is the “plainest” meaning for the word in the context in question.
Clark D. Cunningham, Judith N. Levi, Georgia M. Green & Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Plain Meaning
and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1615 (1994) (book review).
93. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 56; see also LANDAU, supra note 67, at 357
(“Considerations of available space always place practical limits on the number of entries that
can be accommodated, especially in a one-volume dictionary. . . . If a college dictionary did not
limit its entry count, it would run out of space somewhere in the letter D . . . .”); Cunningham et
al., supra note 92, at 1615 (discussing the practical limitations lexicographers face in assembling
word usages). Landau also notes that because dictionaries are expected to define every word
used to define other words, it becomes almost a necessity to develop a complete word list before
beginning to define any of the words. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 357.
94. See generally LANDAU, supra note 67, at 8–42 (discussing the different aspects of
dictionaries).
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1. Intended User and Purpose. As mentioned, many different
kinds of dictionaries exist, each with a different purpose and intended
audience, and the intended audience will dramatically affect every
95
stage of the dictionary-creation process. Trade dictionaries differ
significantly from general dictionaries in the types of sources from
96
which they derive their research. Dictionaries designed to teach a
language tend to describe words in a very different (and often
97
simpler) manner than general-use dictionaries.
2. Prescription Versus Description. One great debate throughout
the history of lexicography has been that of prescription versus
98
description. The older, more conventional perspective, prescription,
“assumes that there is a correctness in English languages as absolute
99
as that in elementary mathematics.” Adherents to this school of
thought presume there is a correct way and an incorrect way to use a
particular word. A prescriptive dictionary “treats the entries in a
dictionary as representing the ‘proper’ way to use English, rather than
100
representing how language actually is being used.” Descriptive
dictionaries, on the other hand, embrace the opposite philosophy:
they simply seek to describe “what members of the speech
101
community do when they communicate with one another.” Much of
the disagreement between proponents of these two methods can be
framed as a battle between grammarians seeking to define the
102
language and linguists seeking to observe and describe it.

95. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., LANDAU, supra note 67, at 32 (“[S]ubject-field dictionaries often have a
normative purpose as well as an informative one, and they tend to be more encyclopedic in
content.”).
97. Id. at 16.
98. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 242–44.
99. MORTON, supra note 84, at 139.
100. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 242.
101. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 2.
102. See, e.g., MORTON, supra note 84, at 138–42 (describing the struggle between
prescriptive grammarians and descriptive linguists). The shift toward description over
prescription began in the mid-twentieth century, as demonstrated by a publication of the
National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) called The English Language Arts, which
supported the idea that language is naturally in constant change and that correctness of the
language “rests on usage.” LANDAU, supra note 67, at 254 (discussing the movement in the
1940s and 1950s toward an understanding of English that embraced natural change and
evolution of the language); cf. MORTON, supra note 84, at 140–41 (discussing NCTE’s polling of
educated writers, businessmen, and others, finding that “grammars and usage books were much
more conservative than the practices of educated users”).
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Modern dictionaries generally follow the descriptive
103
methodology, though some tension still exists in this regard. For
example, much of the controversy over Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary centered on how far toward the descriptive
end of the spectrum it landed—omitting for the first time even
104
normative usage cues such as the “informal” label.
It might be tempting to disregard the discussion of description
versus prescription, given that, by and large, description has won the
battle, and modern dictionaries are clearly more descriptive than
105
those of earlier times. But because the Court often invokes
contemporaneous dictionaries, prescriptive dictionaries find their way
106
into Court opinions, raising the question of whether a dictionary
designed to dictate proper usage can reasonably be used to
demonstrate plain meaning.
3. Size and Scope. Dictionaries come in many different sizes,
107
designed for many different uses. The entire English lexicon is
103. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 243; see also Aprill, supra note 3, at 284
(“Lexicographers did not always prefer description to prescription.”); Erin McKean Redefines
the Dictionary, supra note 91 (“I don’t want to be a traffic cop. . . . So if I had to think of some
kind of occupation as a metaphor for my work [as a lexicographer], I would much rather be a
fisherman. I wanna throw my big net into the deep blue ocean of English and see what
marvelous creatures I can drag up from the bottom.”).
104. The controversy over Webster’s Third is not covered in great detail here, but entire
books have been devoted to the subject. See generally MORTON, supra note 84 (covering the
entire making, controversy, and legacy of Webster’s Third); DICTIONARIES AND THAT
DICTIONARY (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962) (containing dozens of essays and
critiques of Webster’s Third). Justice Scalia even disposed of an unfavorable definition from
Webster’s Third by referring to the controversy discrediting the dictionary. See MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1994) (disregarding the Webster’s Third definition of
the word “modify”); see also William Safire, On Language: Scalia v. Merriam-Webster, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Nov. 20, 2004, at 30, 32 (discussing the MCI case and Scalia’s argument against
Webster’s Third). Despite Justice Scalia’s aversion to it in MCI, Webster’s Third is the Court’s
“most popular usage dictionary, appearing in 102 opinions through the 1997–1998 term.”
Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 262–63.
105. At the same time, some modern dictionaries are more descriptive or prescriptive than
others. For example, the American Heritage Dictionary seeks to chart a more prescriptive path
than Webster’s Third. See Andrew Adam Newman, Wordsmiths: They Also Serve Who Only
Vote on ‘Ain’t,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at B11 (“American Heritage was intended as a more
prescriptive response to Webster’s Third, and to this day dictionaries strive to strike that balance
between guarding and updating the language.”). Interestingly, Justice Scalia serves as a member
of the American Heritage Dictionary’s usage panel, helping to determine the “correct” meaning
of words in this more-prescriptive dictionary. Merriam-Webster has no plans to implement a
usage panel for updates to Webster’s Third. Id.
106. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 16.
107. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
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estimated to be about four million words, yet even an unabridged
109
dictionary might contain only 450,000 of them. Indeed, despite the
common misconception that unabridged dictionaries contain the
entire language, the term, in practice, “has meant a dictionary of
110
400,000 to 600,000 entries.” So-called college dictionaries, by far the
most popular general-use dictionaries in the United States, are
111
smaller, typically containing only 160,000 to 180,000 entries. Desk
dictionaries are smaller still; they often contain only 60,000 to 80,000
112
entries. A one-volume dictionary, of any size, “can cover only a
113
small portion of the vocabulary of a language.” Although the
absence of a particular word from a particular dictionary might tell
the reader something, it does not indicate concretely that the word is
not within the vocabulary of the language.
For the purposes of legal analysis, the statutory or constitutional
words in question are generally acknowledged to be part of the
language; it is their definitions that are in dispute. The size and scope
of the dictionary matter here as well: smaller dictionaries “not only
have fewer entries but their definitions are briefer and fewer senses
114
are given for each word.” This means that a judge searching for the
existence of a particular meaning may find it missing in a college
dictionary even though an unabridged dictionary from the same time
115
period might contain that usage. And lack of space can lead to loss
of meaning on both the research and definition sides of dictionary
creation, because citations are expensive to collect and corpora
expensive to compile. The number of sources that can be referenced

108. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 28.
109. See id. at 29 (referring specifically to Webster’s Third, which was published in 1961); see
also Aprill, supra note 3, at 294–95 (containing a similar discussion of dictionary size).
110. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 30; see also ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 20
(“Even the 20-volume [Oxford English Dictionary] makes no claim to include all the vocabulary
of English.”).
111. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 30.
112. Id. at 31.
113. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 21.
114. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 31 (referring specifically to desk dictionaries); see also id. at
377 (discussing the strict length requirements often imposed on definers by dictionary editors).
115. See Aprill, supra note 3, at 295–96 (noting that “unlike the [Oxford English Dictionary]
or Webster’s Third, the definitions listed for ‘exercise’ in the college edition of Webster’s New
World Dictionary of the American Language do not include any reference to the practice of
religion”). Compare AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 97 (4th
ed. 2000) (including under the definition of “arms,” the example of “troops bearing arms”), with
AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 77 (4th ed. 2002) (lacking this specific example,
with the entire definition including fewer military connotations).
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depends on the budget of the dictionary maker. All in all, a court
looking to see if a particular word could be used in a particular way
should use as thorough a dictionary as possible, lest the meaning in
question be cut solely due to issues of space or budget.
4. Time Lag. Whether a textualist seeks original intent or
original plain meaning of a statute, the relevant time period is the one
contemporary to the drafting of the provision. Therefore, originalists
generally search for definitions published around the time of the
117
relevant language.
Yet, as this discussion demonstrates, creating a dictionary
involves a tremendous amount of work—it takes time. And while that
118
time passes, language is a “moving target.”
Because of the
“inevitable time delay between collection of citations [or assembling
of the corpus] and publication of the dictionary, dictionaries must lag
119
behind current use of the language.” Thus, invoking a dictionary
published the same year as a statute would actually involve using a
definition from several years prior. And usage can change quickly. As
Professor Aprill points out, the 1992 edition of the American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language defines “computer” as “[a] device
that computes, especially a programmable electronic machine that
performs high-speed mathematical or logical operations or that
120
assembles, stores, correlates, or otherwise processes information.”
That definition is technically correct, but it is insufficient for the
121
modern understanding (even in 1992) of a computer’s function.
116. Cf. Richard W. Bailey, Introduction to DICTIONARIES OF ENGLISH, at v (Richard W.
Bailey ed., 1987) (“It would take seven hours or more for a reader to mark the twenty or thirty
new words in a single issue of the New York Times at an estimated cost of sixty dollars;
recording and filing the data would cost very probably forty dollars. Each quotation in the file
would cost very probably three to five dollars.”). In terms of space within the actual book itself,
some unabridged dictionaries choose to spend some margin space on pictures. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 115 (reserving
margin space for pictures on each page, whether or not pictures actually appear there).
117. See, e.g., text accompanying infra note 212.
118. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 47.
119. Aprill, supra note 3, at 287 (“[D]ictionaries are out of date by the time they are
published.”).
120. Id. at 288 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
389 (3d ed. 1992)).
121. And this problem is not resolved even in the Fourth Edition. See AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 115, at 380 (including the
identical definition of “computer,” despite being well into the “computer age,” which the book
also defines on the same page). Interestingly, this edition contains a number of relatively recent
computer-related terms, such as “computerized axial tomography,” “computer literacy,” and
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Courts should take this time lag into account when citing to
dictionary definitions—a dictionary published in 1950 does not
capture the language from 1950 but rather that of some years
122
before.
5. Time Period Covered. In addition to the question of time lag,
the temporal purpose of the dictionary must be taken into account.
Dictionaries can be synchronic or diachronic—meaning that they can
purport to represent the language at one particular time or over a
123
span of time. In modern dictionaries, this choice is essentially
determined by what materials are included in the corpus and citation
124
files. Nearly all one-volume dictionaries made for commercial
purposes in the United States and Britain are synchronic, including
125
the Supreme Court’s most-cited dictionary, Webster’s Third. In
reality, this distinction is more of a spectrum, and “no dictionary can
be purely synchronic, since it takes years to produce any dictionary,
126
and even synchronic dictionaries include some archaic forms.”
Just as accepted modern practice does not resolve the debate
127
surrounding the use of prescriptive versus descriptive dictionaries,
the fact that most contemporary dictionaries are synchronic does not
entirely eliminate the issue of time period covered. The Court often

“computer-aided design.” Id. This example demonstrates that adding new words to a dictionary
may, at times, be easier than accounting for changes in the meanings of older words.
122. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that dictionaries, particularly older ones, are
known to copy each other—so a dictionary from 1850 may include research from the 1830s, and
may simply copy another dictionary from 1830 that is based upon research from the early 1800s.
See, e.g., Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177,
2189 (2003) (noting that Noah Webster “borrowed from earlier dictionaries,” including, at
times, “entry words, definitions, and quotations” without acknowledgement).
123. See LANDAU, supra note 67, at 28 (discussing the differences between synchronic and
diachronic dictionaries).
124. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 71 (discussing examples of synchronic and
diachronic corpora).
125. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 27; see also supra note 104. It should be noted, however,
that “larger synchronic dictionaries such as [Webster’s Third] take in a broader band of time
than smaller works.” LANDAU, supra note 67, at 27. Historical dictionaries, such as the Oxford
English Dictionary, require “a fully diachronic corpus,” like the Oxford Historical Corpus,
which covers twelve centuries. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 71.
126. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 28; see also ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 71
(“Essentially, corpus-builders have to decide ‘how diachronic’ their corpus needs to be in order
to support the kind of lexicography they will be doing.”); supra Part II.C.4.
127. See supra Part II.C.2.
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consults older and sometimes obscure dictionaries and should be
careful, for example, in using etymological dictionaries, which are
129
“specialized diachronic dictionaries,”
or historical dictionaries
designed to represent vast periods of time.
6. Lexigraphic Versus Contextual Analysis. Many words have
130
only one meaning. Yet “[t]he more common a word is, the more
likely it is to have multiple meanings,” and those common words
131
“make up the bulk of most texts.” Determining the boundaries
between those different meanings is both highly subjective and
contextual. “The reality,” the Oxford Guide to Practical Lexicography
states, “turns out to be less clear-cut than the picture presented in
132
dictionaries.” The nature of dictionaries allows them to be used in a
lexigraphic manner, that is, devoid of all context. Yet context is
essential to analysis.
Discussing linguists’ explanation for how people derive meaning
from sentences, Professor Craig Hoffman notes that “[l]inguists
hypothesize that humans are born with a certain ‘genetic endowment’
133
that predisposes us to use language,” and that this skill facilitates
the internalization of certain unspoken rules about structure and
meaning, which allow readers to understand sentences when words or
134
phrases are unclear. This, in turn, makes consideration of the
surrounding context essential to actually understanding what a
sentence means. Using a lexicographic analysis is simply taking a
135
word out of a sentence and defining it. The better method is to view
words within their context—to “parse the statutory sentence and to
128. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790–91 (2008) (reviewing
dictionaries from the 1700s and early 1800s to determine the meaning of the Second
Amendment).
129. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 27.
130. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 264.
131. Id. at 265–66.
132. Id. at 272. Even the dictionaries’ authors themselves have, at times, acknowledged the
inherently subjective nature of dictionaries. See, e.g., Geoffrey Nunberg, Usage in The American
Heritage Dictionary, in THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, supra note 115, at xxviii (“Custom can provide precedents and criticism can
provide principles, but each has to be evaluated at the bar of opinion.”).
133. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 408.
134. See id. at 407–08 (explaining the complex inner working of sentence structure and
noting that all fluent speakers seem to inherently understand sentences even without
referencing such rules).
135. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 264 (describing lexicographers’ goal of
identifying and describing “word senses”).

RUBIN IN FINAL

2010]

10/7/2010 7:33:39 PM

TEXTUALIST USE OF DICTIONARIES

189
136

explore the syntactic relationships among its constituents.”
Dictionaries, therefore, “are less helpful when the inquiry properly
137
extends beyond the word level,” as statutory interpretation always
does.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR TEXTUALIST USE OF DICTIONARIES
The numerous complications related to judicial use of
dictionaries do not necessarily mean that dictionaries cannot be used
in a manner consistent with textualism—but the Court should account
for these factors when citing to dictionaries in textualist analysis. This
Part proposes a framework for the use of dictionaries in textualist
analysis of both statutes and constitutional provisions.
First, in order to have a coherent framework, it is important to
annunciate a general theory under which a dictionary is used for
construing legal language—that is, what is the purpose of using a
dictionary to look up a word? As the preceding discussion has shown,
a dictionary is the result of extensive research and academic judgment
and, when published, is the end-product-for-the-masses of research
into the lexicon in much the same way that an encyclopedia article on
nuclear fusion is the mass-marketed version of research into nuclear
physics. In invoking a dictionary to define a word, one is not really
searching for what the dictionary says, but rather what the word
means within the lexicon. The dictionary, then, is simply the window
through which one seeks to find that meaning. Ultimately, a court
using a dictionary is allowing it to stand in as a proxy for the lexicon.
But because the end goal is finding the correct meaning within the
lexicon—not the dictionary—the limitations of dictionaries must be
recognized lest the court find the answer to the wrong question.
Dictionaries are proxies, and they can be good ones or bad ones. The
following framework seeks to account for the limitations that make
dictionaries, at times, bad proxies for the lexicon and to provide ways
138
to make them better.
136. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 402.
137. Id. at 406.
138. Some of these rules have been suggested in one way or another in one of several
previous articles on dictionaries and the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 21, at
402 (discussing the role of context); Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2177–78 (discussing the
differences in meaning that can be difficult to ascertain from older dictionaries). My goal here is
to bring together these suggestions in one cohesive collection in much the same style of
Professor H. Jefferson Powell’s Rules for Originalists. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, Rules
for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987) (collecting fourteen rules for the responsible use of
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A. Use Contextual Analysis Only
Dictionaries are inherently acontextual—they focus on
individual words, devoid of the meaning created by the words and
139
sentences around them. Justice Scalia himself has mentioned the
need for considering context in the use of dictionaries. In Smith v.
140
United States, Justice Scalia excoriated the majority’s construction
of the word “use” as inconsistent with the clear context of the statute
141
in question. Instead of simply picking a word out and defining it, as
Justice Scalia claims the majority did in Smith, or as he himself could
142
be said to have done in District of Columbia v. Heller, judges should
use dictionaries with the understanding that words “never stand by
themselves,” but rather “derive their meaning from context and their
143
background in the relevant culture.” Without context, a word is
meaningless. And without considering context, so too is the use of a
dictionary to define a single statutory term.
Professor Hoffman describes two contrasting methods in which
the Court might use the dictionary: the “definition” method, which
involves defining words the reader of the statute might not know, and
the “verification” method, wherein the Court verifies that a word
144
could have a definition that the Court is assigning to it. Hoffman
argues that verification is dangerous because by using a dictionary to
see if a word could mean what the Court is hoping it might mean, the
Court is neglecting to “parse the statutory sentence as a first step in

history in constitutional interpretation). Though Professor Powell’s article does not address
dictionaries, its analysis of the use of historical evidence in originalist constitutional
interpretation is similar in purpose to this Note—as is some of the advice. See, e.g., id. at 660
(“[T]he turn to history does not obviate the personal responsibility of the originalist interpreter
for the positions he takes, because historical research itself, when undertaken responsibly,
requires of the interpreter the constant exercise of judgment.”).
139. See Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2206 (“Dictionaries by their very nature do not provide
the precise meaning of a word as it is used in a particular context.”). Judge Randolph refers to
dictionaries as “word zoos” because “[o]ne can observe an animal’s features in the zoo, but one
still cannot be sure how the animal will behave in its native surroundings.” A. Raymond
Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 71, 74 (1994).
140. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
141. See id. at 241–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We are dealing here not with a technical word
or an ‘artfully defined’ legal term, but with common words that are . . . inordinately sensitive to
context.” (citation omitted)); see also infra Part IV.A.
142. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); see also infra Part IV.B.
143. Taylor, supra note 28, at 364 (quoting CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 114 (1990)).
144. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 402.
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its linguistic analysis,” leading it to miss contextual clues which might
have allowed it to better understand the intended meaning of the
145
language. This distinction is helpful for considering the role of
context in textualist analysis: if a court is looking for the honest, true
meaning of a word within a statute (presuming there is such a thing as
a true meaning), then the context should control over an external
source such as a dictionary. Indeed, the drafter of the language could
use a completely new word, or use an old word in a new and possibly
146
“incorrect” way—and the context would still control its meaning.
B. Establish Only Outer Boundaries
Building upon the previous rule, courts should only use
dictionaries to establish outer boundaries of what a word could (or
147
could not) mean—not to determine one true and right meaning.
The basic limitations of lexicography make such a rule necessary.
First, dictionaries are the result of subjective processes at several
different levels from the choice of data sources to the development of
148
distinct usages for each word. In addition, dictionaries—even
unabridged dictionaries—function under limits on size and scope that
can ultimately lead to the omission of a word or a particular meaning
149
150
of a word. And due to problems such as time lag, which even
when accounted for is relatively indeterminate, one can never be
certain that the absence of a definition in a particular dictionary
means that the definition is absent from the lexicon itself. Thus,
dictionaries, even when accounting for all of these issues, should be
used only to say what a word could mean, not what it must mean—
151
they can only establish outer boundaries.

145. Id.
146. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
147. See Note, supra note 3, at 1452 (“[D]ictionaries should occupy a space at the beginning
rather than at the end of the interpretative process.”); see also Solan, supra note 30, at 2056
(“The problem with using dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of a word . . . is that
the purpose of a dictionary is to determine the outer boundaries of appropriate usage for each
entry.”).
148. See supra notes 76–77, 88–90 and accompanying text.
149. See supra Part II.C.3.
150. See supra Part II.C.4.
151. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 296 (“Although dictionaries cannot
provide the end point in defining terms, dictionaries are a proper and useful source in
determining what a word may mean.”). This is not to say that a court would not ultimately
decide what a word means in the context of a statute—indeed, that is the job of the court in
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C. Use Contemporaneous Research on Word Meaning
New textualist judges, such as Justice Scalia, have been generally
consistent with their interpretive theory by using dictionaries
152
published around the time of a provision’s enactment. But proper
153
usage is complicated due to the inherent qualities of dictionaries.
154
Language is a “moving target,” and citing a dictionary from 1787 to
reflect the common understanding at the time the Constitution was
written is actually to cite research from some years before 1787—the
155
sources used could potentially date back decades.
Language
changes can occur rapidly, as evidenced by the change in noun
capitalization between the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights
in 1789—two documents written closely in time, yet utilizing different
156
rules for capitalization of nouns.
It can be very difficult to determine the time frame in which a
157
dictionary was created, however. As such, courts (and litigants)
should only use dictionaries to establish an outer boundary—
158
consistent with the “areas of meaning” mentioned above—by
examining various dictionaries from the years surrounding a
provision. Agreement among several such dictionaries would seem to
indicate a consistency of usage.
D. Justify the Choice of Dictionary and Definition
What makes a dictionary reliable? According to the Oxford
Guide to Practical Lexicography, a reliable dictionary “is one whose

statutory or constitutional interpretation. Instead, this Section argues that the dictionary itself
should not be used to provide a dispositive meaning of a word.
152. See, e.g., infra Part IV.B.
153. See supra Part II.C.4–5.
154. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 47.
155. See supra Part II.C.4.
156. The real question, perhaps, is which printing of the Constitution to consider. The rules
regarding capitalization seemed to be in such flux at the time that different printings of the
Constitution from early in the Republic have been found to have numerous differences in
capitalization and punctuation. See Denys P. Myers, History of the Printed Archetype of the
Constitution of the United States of America, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 217, 240 (2008) (“The
Committee of Style and Arrangement allowed [Jacob] Shallus to capitalize every noun in his
engrossing but it was restrained in using initial capitals in the printed copy for the Federal
Convention.”).
157. See supra Part II.C.4.
158. S.I. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 57–58 (4th ed. 1978) (noting
that dictionaries are useful not for finding one true perfect meaning but rather for determining
“areas of meaning” surrounding a word).
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generalizations about word behavior approximate closely to the ways
in which people normally use and understand language when
engaging in real communicative acts (such as writing novels or
159
business reports, reading newspapers, or having conversations).”
Given the complicated research and deliberation required to create a
dictionary, it stands to reason that not all dictionaries are created
160
equal.
Further, even dictionaries of equal quality can be designed for
substantially different purposes. Is a college dictionary sufficient to
support an assertion about the absence of a particular meaning?
Probably not, especially when a contemporaneous unabridged
161
dictionary does contain that meaning. Yet even very recently the
Supreme Court has cited collegiate dictionaries to demonstrate the
162
absence of a particular word meaning. Though specific cases might
present exceptions, an originalist seeking to understand the breadth
of a word’s plain meaning would generally want to consult a
respected unabridged, contemporary, synchronic dictionary.
Furthermore, the Court should actually justify its choice of
dictionary and usage explicitly, stepping out from behind the aura of
authority dictionaries generally provide to explain why a particular
dictionary is well suited for the task to which it is being applied. The
Court rarely does this, generally noting at most the contemporaneous
163
publication date. Instead, the Court should make “at least some
prima facie argument about the relevance of that particular
164
dictionary” to the question at hand. Moreover, the Court should
demonstrate why its chosen dictionary is reliable, suitably
contemporary and complete, and duly representative of the language
159. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 45.
160. As mentioned, Justice Scalia has used this argument to dismiss Webster’s Third despite
it being the Court’s most commonly cited dictionary. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Part II.C.3.
162. See, e.g., Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 n.10 (2010) (noting that “specified” is
not synonymous with “implied” or “anticipated” and citing WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1116 (1974) for support).
163. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008) (seeking the
eighteenth-century meaning of “arms” by looking to dictionaries from 1771, 1773, and 1828).
164. Note, supra note 3, at 1453. This suggestion also carries with it the need to justify the
use of any dictionary, as it “is not always easy to tell when a statute is ambiguous.” LAWRENCE
M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 93 (1993); see also Taylor, supra note 28, at 356 (“The
problem is that the meaning of plain meaning is itself not plain.”). Over time, certain
dictionaries would likely become de facto justified for particular uses on the basis of their
repeated use in such instances. At present, such repeated use exists, but a justification for doing
so does not.
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it seeks to define. Similarly, if the Court selects a particular usage as
the “correct” one, it should justify why that definition is superior to
165
others.
E. Use Multiple Dictionaries
In accordance with the idea that dictionaries should establish
166
only outer boundaries, it seems reasonable for the Court to consult
more than one dictionary. The wide discrepancy in the definitions of
terms among contemporary, respectable dictionaries is well
established; for example, the Supreme Court has addressed the
167
definition of the word “sacrilege,” a word which has a more
expansive meaning in Webster’s Third than in the American Heritage
168
Dictionary. Why should the first dictionary taken from the shelf
169
control over other equally qualified dictionaries? If judges are to be
truly objective in their quest to determine the ordinary meaning of a
word, only a scientific approach—a survey of relevant dictionaries—
can bring to light what consensus, if any, exists. To consider only one
dictionary risks looking out over the proverbial cocktail party and
selecting a friendly face, as Justice Scalia fears with legislative
170
history. Using a survey method would instead promote objectivity

165. See infra Part III.F; see also Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2205 (discussing the problems
presented by the Court taking the first definition listed in a particular dictionary as the primary
meaning, given that many dictionaries order definitions historically or provide no method for
the ordering of definitions).
166. See supra Part III.B.
167. E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 525–26 (1952).
168. Compare WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1996 (1993)
(defining “sacrilege” as “the crime of stealing, misusing, or desecrating that which is sacred holy,
or dedicated to sacred uses,” “the unworthy or irreverent use of sacred persons, places, or
things,” and “the profanation of that which is dedicated to God or to sacred purposes”), with
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 115, at 1530
(defining “sacrilege” simply as “desecration, profanation, misuse, or theft of something
sacred”). The American Heritage Dictionary’s definition seems limited to things whereas
Webster’s Third explicitly includes persons and places, as well as an internal suggestion as to the
definition of sacred—that it includes things “dedicated to God.” While this distinction might be
narrow, it could have been relevant to the Court’s consideration of the word in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), where the court found it impossible to determine the
meaning of “sacred” in the context of media censorship. Id. at 526.
169. This is not to say that all dictionaries are equal. There might be multiple dictionaries,
however, which meet the criteria discussed in this Part concerning a given use, and judges
should utilize multiple dictionaries rather than just the first acceptable one they encounter.
170. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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and prevent judges from selecting definitions based solely on their
171
personal preferences.
F. Acknowledge Contrary Definitions and Dictionaries
Instead of considering one dictionary authoritative, the proper
authority for lexicographical meaning should be the lexicon itself, with
172
each dictionary providing only a window into the lexicon. A
dictionary is a proxy for demonstrating that the lexicon does (or does
not) contain a certain meaning. Litigants and judges alike should
cease the practice of citing to one dictionary alone to make a claim
about the lexicon when another relevant dictionary supports the
opposite claim—both definitions should be explicitly acknowledged,
given that together they make one overall suggestion about the
173
lexicon. Proper legal arguments should address whether the weight
of the evidence supports or fails to support a particular reading of the
174
lexicon as a whole.
In this vein, judges (and even litigants) should acknowledge
those dictionaries which strike against the meaning presented in a
brief or opinion. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to cite to
175
contrary controlling authority when such authority exists. The
171. Justice Scalia’s criticism of Webster’s Third’s definition of “modify” in MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994), suggests that he, too, should
support this principle. Id. at 225–27. In proclaiming Webster’s Third’s broader definition of the
word invalid because it contradicted many other dictionaries, Justice Scalia implicitly acceded to
the notion that some survey method is necessary—otherwise, the sole dictionary used could
itself be an outlier. Had Webster’s Third been the only dictionary the Court consulted in MCI, it
seems likely that the definition Justice Scalia rejected would have been accepted as a possibility.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 136–38.
173. One could still attack one of the dictionaries as being inaccurate, poorly made, or
inapplicable. This argument is quite similar to that of Professor Frederick F. Schauer regarding
legal arguments in general. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 72 (2009) (“Even more frequently, optional authorities
are employed in a way that hovers precariously on the edge of genuine authority. Thus, when a
lawyer in a brief, a judge in an opinion, or a scholar in a law review article makes reference to an
authority, it is often to provide so-called support for some proposition. . . . But the idea of
‘support’ here is odd. The authority alleged to provide support is often not one that supports a
proposition more than another authority negates it. This kind of ‘support’ is a peculiar sense of
authority, because the balance of all the authorities might not point in one direction or another,
or might even point against the very proposition allegedly being supported.” (citation omitted)).
174. This, in turn, is quite similar to this Note’s earlier argument regarding the survey
method and the use of multiple dictionaries. See supra Part III.E.
175. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not
knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel . . . .”).
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specific requirement specified in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct leaves plenty of room to ignore contrary dictionary
definitions as noncontrolling without technically violating the rule,
but honest scholarship requires something more when dictionaries are
being cited as true authority that a particular word in the lexicon
176
means (or doesn’t mean) something. There is an almost dishonest
quality to citing a dictionary as demonstrating a lack of support for a
particular meaning with the knowledge that other, equally
appropriate dictionaries or definitions do support that meaning. The
dissent in a judicial opinion, or an opponent in litigation, can be left
to account for the discrepancy—but such tactics result in two
177
opinions, each holding up different dictionaries and claiming a
monopoly on the “true meaning” of a word when both sides know
that their chosen dictionary demonstrates no such true meaning. This
situation is different from that of citing noncontrolling case law. A
noncontrolling court ruling from another jurisdiction is not cited to
demonstrate what the law says, but rather what another court said,
which may or may not be in accordance with the law in the authoring
court’s jurisdiction. Conversely, both dictionaries cited to support
opposing propositions invoke the same source of authority: the
lexicon.
G. Account for Weaknesses in Older Dictionaries
Methods of researching language and creating dictionaries have
changed over time, generally evolving toward methods that pose
fewer problems for textualism. First, modern dictionaries are more
descriptive in nature than their predecessors, making definitions more
178
objective and reflective of the plain or ordinary meaning of words.
Second, the use of a corpus makes the research materials more
objective than in the past by relying less on the process of selecting
specific (and sometimes highly uncommon) usages for inclusion in
lexicographical research and more on the use of whole sources, such
179
as entire newspapers. And finally, modern computing technology
allows those databases to encompass a quantity of material far greater

176. The purpose of this Note and other similarly focused articles, however, is to undermine
the idea that any dictionary can be the one true authority on the meaning of a word.
177. Sometimes opposing opinions will even cite to different editions of the same dictionary.
See infra Part IV.B.
178. See supra Part II.C.2.
179. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
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than the handwritten citation files of the past, making the data a
180
better survey of the whole language. But if a court is to use a
contemporaneous dictionary when interpreting an older statute or a
constitutional provision, it must consider all the weaknesses of the
methods used in compiling older dictionaries. The Supreme Court,
for example, frequently cites old dictionaries when considering
181
language from the Constitution, but the Court seldom justifies why
the specific dictionaries selected are reliable and whether the
problems of prescription and completeness have been accounted for
in the selection. Such justification is most needed with older
dictionaries, because “modern judge[s] construing an old statute with
the help of an old dictionary will not have the same intuitive sense of
the language of the statute and dictionary” as they would with
182
modern language. In addition, Rickie Sonpal points out the
183
additional problems of politics in older dictionaries and the inability
of modern judges to understand “the sexual and moral connotations
184
[older] dictionaries attribute to the words.” Generally speaking, if
the language in question “predates Webster’s Second or the first
edition of the [Oxford English Dictionary], the textualist will need to
remember that older dictionaries are less broadly based and thus less
185
reliable than modern dictionaries.”
Overall, older dictionaries present a particular danger in analysis.
Well-meaning judges can easily attribute inaccurate meanings to
statutory or constitutional language due to older dictionaries’ political
nature, tendency to prescribe rather than describe the language, and
weaker methodology. Furthermore, a modern judge may lack the
intuitive knowledge about older usage that might have allowed a
186
judge more contemporary to the statute to properly understand it.

180. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2177–78 (discussing Justice Thomas’s use of
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773), NATHANIEL
BAILEY, AN UNIVERSITY ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789), and
THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796),
in defining the word “commerce”).
182. Id. at 2206.
183. See id. at 2212–13 (discussing, for example, the Court’s willingness to rely on Samuel
Johnson’s dictionary despite clearly demonstrated “linguistic and nationalistic prejudices—
including his scorn for American English and his refusal to record it”).
184. Id. at 2214.
185. Aprill, supra note 3, at 332.
186. To avoid these problems, Sonpal recommends a “usage based” approach, looking to
contemporary primary sources instead of dictionaries, Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2215–19,
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H. Recognize the Limitations
As this framework shows, the use of dictionaries is complicated
and their effectiveness in determining the plain meaning of text is
more limited than many would like to believe. But these limitations
exist nonetheless. A statute could use a word in an entirely new and
previously incorrect way—but if, as textualists argue, the text of the
statute controls, an incorrect or creative use of a word, if supported
by the context in which it is used, must control above all else.
Otherwise, the text yields to an external source of interpretation, and
187
dictionaries become very much like legislative history indeed.
Likewise, the problems associated with older dictionaries may render
them completely unusable in certain circumstances; in such situations,
other methods, such as Sonpal’s suggestion of a “usage based”
188
approach or an appeal to common law or common sense, might be
more appropriate.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
This Part applies the framework for using dictionaries properly
in legal reasoning to two Supreme Court cases, testing whether the
framework proposed in this Note would have assisted the Court in its
reasoning.
A. The Smith Case
Smith v. United States is perhaps the most frequently discussed
case concerning the Court and dictionaries, and the case is one of
189
Justice Scalia’s favorite examples of flawed acontextual reasoning.
Smith involved the application of a statute that increased penalties if,
“during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
190
crime . . . [a person] uses or carries a firearm.” The defendant in

though he acknowledges the cost and time issues with such research, noting that truly analyzing
a word might take the “experienced editors of the Oxford English Dictionary over one month,”
id. at 2219. This Note argues that a dictionary could still be relevant if used properly, but
Sonpal’s point stands: old dictionaries can be problematic.
187. See supra Part I.C.
188. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 23–24 (describing Smith as an example of strict
constructionism, “a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into
disrepute”).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. at 227–41 (interpreting § 924(c)(1)).
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question “used” a MAC-10 machine gun by bartering it for drugs.
Arguing before the Court, the defendant-petitioner asserted that the
192
statute only applied if the gun were used as a weapon.
193
Justice
Explicitly invoking an ordinary meaning analysis,
O’Connor acknowledged that “[l]anguage . . . cannot be interpreted
apart from context” and that “[t]he meaning of a word that appears
ambiguous if viewed in isolation may become clear when the word is
194
analyzed in light of the terms that surround it.” Nonetheless, Justice
O’Connor, writing for the Court, utilized Webster’s Second to define
“to use” as “[t]o convert to one’s service” or “to employ” and thus
195
found bartering to be within that definition. Despite declaring
context central to the analysis, the Court went on to decide that
bartering a gun was “using” it within the meaning of the statute on
196
the basis of the dictionary’s inclusion of such a definition.
Justice Scalia’s dissent—and his subsequent book on
interpretation—excoriate the majority’s use of the dictionary, stating
that for a word as “elastic” as “use,” context is particularly
197
important. As a demonstration of ordinary meaning, Justice Scalia
asked what someone would imagine using a cane to mean—it would
not indicate displaying a cane on the wall, but would rather, to an
ordinary listener, refer to using it to walk. Use of a firearm, he
argued, is similar: “[T]o speak of ‘using a firearm’ is to speak of using
198
it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.” The majority’s
construction of this common word, Justice Scalia wrote, is
199
“unquestionably not reasonable and normal.”

191. Smith, 508 U.S. at 227–28.
192. Id. at 229.
193. See id. at 228 (“When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in
accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”).
194. Id. at 229.
195. Id. at 228–29 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2806 (2d ed.
1950)). The Court also utilized Black’s Law Dictionary, which had a similar definition. Id. at 229
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990)).
196. Id. at 229.
197. See id. at 241–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is . . . a fundamental principle of statutory
construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined
in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.” (quoting Deal v. United
States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993))).
198. Id. at 242.
199. Id. at 243.
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Applying his distinction between verification uses and definition
200
uses to Smith, Professor Hoffman describes the majority’s argument
as relying on a flawed verification method:
Although it professes to be interested in the ‘ordinary meaning’ of
the word that it is defining, the majority ignores the syntactic context
in which the word appears. . . . ‘The Court does not appear to grasp
the distinction between how a word can be used and how it
201
ordinarily is used.’

Such a statement is at the heart of the rule that context should be
given primacy over single-word definitions; dictionaries should not be
used to say that a word can mean something that stretches it beyond
its context.
In fact, perhaps the real problem with the majority’s approach in
Smith is the use of a dictionary at all. The statute was relatively
modern, and everyone on the Court, in the gallery, and in the high
school down the street knew what “use” can mean—the Court was
supposed to be determining what it meant within the text of the statute.
This problematic use of a dictionary highlights two of the rules
proposed in the framework above: the majority in Smith failed to
apply the rules of contextuality, and establishing only outer
202
boundaries. A proper application of the suggested framework would
have resolved the statutory question in the other direction: bartering
a gun would not be considered “using” it, and the increased penalties
would not have attached.
B. The Heller Case
Decided in 2008, District of Columbia v. Heller provides an
opportunity to apply other parts of the proposed framework to a
recent and still much-debated constitutional question: does the
Second Amendment provide an individual right to possess a firearm,
203
or a collective right referring only to militias? To resolve that

200. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
201. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 421–22 (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 242). Professor Hoffman
praises Justice Scalia’s approach in the dissent as proper. See id. at 423 (calling Justice Scalia’s
reasoning an “admirable attempt to throw off” an out-of-context method of dictionary use).
202. See supra Part III.A–B.
203. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2008) (noting the
disagreement between the petitioners and the respondent over whether the amendment relates
only to militia service or to “an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in
a militia”).
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question, the Court analyzed the language of the Second
Amendment, which reads: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
204
Arms, shall not be infringed.”
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted the uniqueness
within the Constitution of the first clause of the Second Amendment,
205
an explanation of purpose which he termed the “prefatory clause.”
Justice Scalia then compared it to the structure of other founding-era
206
documents. Citing to a later-modified rule from a 1716 English
case—which held that preambles “could not be used to restrict the
effect of the words of the purview”—Justice Scalia declared that it is
settled law in America that a prefatory clause is not controlling when
207
the operative clause is clear and unambiguous, though a prefatory
clause could be useful for the sole purpose of “ensur[ing] that our
reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced
208
purpose.”
For the purposes of this Note, the most interesting aspect of the
case is the Court’s construction of the operative clause. Justice Scalia
209
broke it into parts—“right of the people” and “to keep and bear
210
Arms” —and addressed each separately. Although Justice Scalia
properly looked to other sources beyond historical dictionaries (such
as other founding-era documents), the dictionary played a starring

204. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
205. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789. Scholars have argued that Justice Scalia noted this separation
simply to reach his desired conclusion and that such a division is not supported by the syntax,
legislative history, or the historical context of the amendment. See, e.g., William G. Merkel, The
District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 349, 365 (2009) (noting that dividing the prefatory clause and the operative
clause was “a crucial step for Justice Scalia as it allow[ed] him to uncouple the right to arms
from the militia,” even though such an argument is in conflict with the “syntax, the debates in
the first Congress, and [the] historical context”); see also Brief for Professors of Linguistics and
English Dennis E. Baron et al. in Support of Petitioners at 5–14, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07290) (discussing how the structure of the Second Amendment makes the so-called prefatory
clause an essential component of the meaning of the operative clause).
206. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789 (“Although this structure of the Second Amendment is
unique in our Constitution, other legal documents of the founding era, particularly individualrights provisions of state constitutions, commonly included a prefatory statement of purpose.”).
207. Id. at 2789 n.3 (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.04 (5th ed. 1992) (citing Copeman v. Gallant, [1716] 24 Eng.
Rep. 404 (Ch.))).
208. Id. at 2790.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2791.
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role in defining “keep,” “bear,” and “arms.” Justice Scalia cited to a
number of dictionaries, including Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of
the English Language (1773), Timothy Cunningham’s A New and
Complete Law Dictionary (1771), and Webster’s American Dictionary
212
of the English Language (1828). Applying the framework, a number
of issues arise.
1. Use Contextual Analysis Only and Establish Only Outer
Boundaries. Perhaps the fundamental problem with Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Heller is that he did exactly what he criticized the majority
213
for doing in Smith; to borrow Professor Hoffman’s terminology,
214
Justice Scalia used a verification argument. That is, Justice Scalia
chose definitions (that “arms” means any kind of weapon, and that
“keep arms” means to have such weapons) and invoked the
dictionary to say that those meanings were correct because the
215
dictionary contained them. But the extent of what a dictionary can
be used to say about the matter is that the words could have the
meanings Justice Scalia attributed to them—not that they must have
216
those meanings in a given context. In his dissent in Smith, Justice
Scalia noted that “[t]he Court does not appear to grasp the distinction
217
between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used.” The
Court, this time represented by Justice Scalia, failed to make that
218
distinction in Heller as well.
211. See id. (beginning his analysis by looking at the dictionary definitions of “arms”).
212. Id. (citing 1 JOHNSON, supra note 181; 1 TIMOTHY CUNNIGHAM, A NEW AND
COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (London 1771); NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828)).
213. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 23–24 (criticizing the Smith majority’s use of the dictionary
to define “use” in a manner inconsistent with its plain meaning within the statutory context).
214. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
215. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791–92 (explaining Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the
amendment’s language).
216. And ironically, the strongest piece of contextual evidence is exactly that which Justice
Scalia quickly dismissed: the prefatory clause.
217. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993). Indeed, Justice Stevens’s dissent uses
this specific quote to criticize Justice Scalia’s acontextual construction of the Second
Amendment. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2829–30 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. The issue in Heller is a bit more complicated than the controversy in Smith, because the
phrase “keep and bear Arms” is both more complex than a word such as “use,” and because it is
found in a much older document. And indeed, it may be that Justice Scalia’s interpretation of
the language is correct—the majority does provide other contextual arguments from the
founding era. The dictionary, however, simply cannot be used to say that the Second
Amendment must provide an individual right. All it can be used to show is that it could provide
such a right, depending on the context.
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2. Use Contemporaneous Research on Word Meaning. At first
glance, the Court seems to have followed this rule, but most of the
research leading to the creation of the dictionaries cited by the
majority actually came from the decades before the founding era. For
example, Justice Scalia cited the 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s
Dictionary of the English Language and the 1771 edition of Timothy
219
Cunningham’s A New and Complete Law Dictionary. Considering
220
time lag in older dictionaries and the tendency of old dictionaries to
221
these two works reference the
copy even older dictionaries,
language as much as forty years or more before the Second
222
Amendment was written. However, Justice Scalia also referred to
223
Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language,
224
which seems a better fit for this analysis and appears to follow the
concept of citing to multiple dictionaries.
3. Acknowledge Contrary Definitions and Dictionaries and
Recognize the Limitations. Perhaps the most frustrating part about
both the majority and the dissent in Heller is the failure—on both
sides—to acknowledge contrary dictionary definitions. For example,
although Webster’s 1828 dictionary supports the definition of “arms”
225
that Justice Scalia selected, defining “arms” as “[w]eapons of
offense, or armor for defense and protection of the body,” the same
226
dictionary also provides a second definition: “[w]ar; hostility.” The

219. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791; see also supra note 212.
220. See supra Part II.C.4.
221. See supra note 122.
222. And this gap in time can matter. For a discussion of the changes in the English
language around the founding era, see supra note 156. Justice Scalia himself has, in the past,
been sensitive to time gaps of this size. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218,
228 (1994) (noting that when the Communications Act became law in 1934, Webster’s Third
“was not yet even contemplated,” even though Webster’s Third was published in 1976 and thus
probably contains research from the decades before that time).
223. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791; see also supra note 212.
224. In his dissent, Justice Stevens cites THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 634 (2d ed.
1989) to provide a definition for “bear arms,” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
which was created at a time far later than the relevant period.
225. WEBSTER, supra note 212; see also Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791 (citing WEBSTER, supra
note 212, and likening this dictionary’s definition to the definitions provided by other
dictionaries, which say that “arms” are weapons of offense or armor of defense).
226. WEBSTER, supra note 212.
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entry then gives a number of examples of arms, several of which
227
involve war or soldiers.
In the dissent, Justice Stevens cited another edition of one of the
same dictionaries cited by the majority to reach the opposite
conclusion. Justice Stevens referenced the 1755 edition of Samuel
Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language to assert that “arms”
228
refers to “[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence.” Justice
Stevens also referred to “literally dozens of contemporary texts” to
say that “bear arms” “refers most naturally to a military
229
purpose,” —just as Justice Scalia did to make the opposite
230
argument. Neither side seemed willing to acknowledge the other
side’s evidence—including the warring dictionary definitions.
The dispute in Heller typifies the problem that this Note
addresses. The dictionary was used by both sides in the same way that
Justice Scalia argues that legislative history can be incorrectly used in
judicial interpretation: as an external, nonauthoritative source used to
pick out a supporting argument while ignoring any contradictory
information in that same source. A dictionary simply cannot be used
to say that a word like “bear” or “arms” must have meant a particular
thing—in fact, the very dictionaries used by the Justices show that
those words could have meant several different things. But such
acknowledgements are absent from the opinions. Instead, both sides
231
in Heller use dictionaries to prop up conflicting evidence as decisive.

227. See id. (providing, for example, that “[t]o arms” denotes “taking arms for war or
hostility; particularly a summoning to war”). Interestingly, Webster also provides another
definition of “arms,” stating that, “[i]n law, arms are any thing which a man takes in his hand in
anger, to strike or assault another.” Id.
228. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 JOHNSON, supra note 181
(London, 1st ed. 1755)). Justice Stevens also quoted from a dictionary-like reference guide from
1794 to say that “[b]y arms, we understand those instruments of offence generally made use of
in war.” Id. (quoting JOHN TRUSLER, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS ESTEEMED
SYNONYMOUS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 37 (London, 3d ed. 1794)).
229. Id.
230. E.g., id. at 2792 n.7 (majority opinion). That said, considerable evidence suggests that
the general use of “bear arms” contemporary to the Second Amendment was overwhelmingly
related to military service. See Merkel, supra note 205, at 353 (discussing findings from over 120
American newspapers contemporary to the Second Amendment suggesting that roughly 98
percent of the uses of the phrase were related to military or militia service).
231. It is not correct that the responsibility for making counterarguments lies with the other
side. A strong supporting argument in favor of contradictory evidence is not necessary, but the
simple acknowledgment that such evidence exists is. It is inaccurate to say that the evidence
clearly supports one meaning while evidence exists suggesting otherwise. See supra Part III.F.
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Neither side recognizes the limitations inherent in citation to
dictionaries.
4. Demonstrating a Potential Bias. As discussed in Part III, a
dictionary is essentially used as a proxy for the meaning of a word
within the language as a whole—much as a survey might be used as a
232
proxy for the opinions of the population as a whole. The use of
dictionaries as proxies is, perhaps, necessary in textualist
interpretation because conducting a true linguistic analysis is far too
burdensome for a court to do on its own. Recognizing the rationale
behind the use of dictionaries, it is interesting that the Heller majority
did not more directly engage with a truer proxy for word meaning:
the considered research and findings of linguistics professors on this
233
specific subject. Rarely are such findings available for the Court to
use. In Heller, however, professors of linguistics and English filed an
amicus brief discussing in great detail the linguistic construction of the
Second Amendment with an eye toward how it would have been
234
perceived at the time of its creation.
The professors’ brief accounts for all of the considerations that
the blind use of dictionaries fails to: it considers the context of the
235
words, it focuses on contemporary writings in making its structural
comparisons, and it uses multiple lexicographic sources for reaching
236
its conclusions. Justice Scalia, however, preferred a dictionary
237
approach to that of the linguistics experts. According to the amicus
brief, a broader survey of dictionaries and contemporary writings
reveals that “[i]n each instance where ‘bear arms’ . . . is used without
additional language modifying the phrase, it is unquestionably used in
its ordinary idiomatic sense,” which is service as a soldier in the

232. See supra Part III.F.
233. For a discussion of the true goal of using a dictionary as a window into the lexicon, see
supra Part III.
234. Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron et al. in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 205.
235. In fact, the brief’s entire first argument focuses on how the structure of the Second
Amendment affects the meaning of the words within it. See id. at 5–14 (arguing that the
“absolute construction” of the prefatory clause causes it to function as a sentence modifier).
236. See id. (utilizing structural comparison and multiple sources of meaning to assess the
plain meaning of the Second Amendment).
237. See id. at 23–24 (examining usage in “books, pamphlets, broadsides, and newspapers
from the period between the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Second
Amendment”).
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In fact, historian Saul Cornell compiled 115 texts
military.
containing the phrase “bear arms,” finding that 110 used it in a
military context and that four of the remaining five added additional
239
words to the phrase to give it a nonmilitary context. Justice Scalia’s
preference for the dictionary (and his own linguistic intuition) over
the scientific method used by the linguistics professors is troubling
because it places more importance on a judge’s personal perspective
240
on the language than on objective research.
CONCLUSION
Textualism demands adherence to an objective, original meaning
of the text. Thus, it is no surprise that dictionaries are so appealing to
textualists: dictionaries present an aura of objective authority, and
there are dictionaries from any time period relevant for legal analysis.
But fidelity to textualist principles requires a disciplined approach to
using dictionaries because they are neither as objective nor as
authoritative as they seem. And their misuse can lead to exactly what
textualists often bemoan: the personal preferences of judges creeping
into their interpretations of statutes or the Constitution.
Although some writers have concluded that the inner workings
and flaws of dictionaries make them completely unsuitable for use by
judges and litigants, this Note has sought to provide a different
approach, identifying the complications provided by dictionaries—
some mentioned in previous articles, some new—and creating a broad
framework centered upon avoiding those pitfalls. If textualists, and
indeed all judges, can account for the dangers inherent in the use of
dictionaries in legal interpretation, perhaps they can still use
dictionaries to provide valuable insight without undermining the
objective rationality that is central to legal discourse.

238. Id. at 20–21.
239. Id. at 24.
240. One could attack the linguistics professors, whose brief supported the petitioners, for
their own biases. But a proper argument would instead be directed to the validity of their
findings. Further, this Section does not intend to imply that scientific linguistic analysis should
automatically merit total deference. The point is that the Court had the benefit of this
information, which is conceptually truer to textualist aims than dictionaries can hope to be, and
engaged with it only minimally.

